Premier was a brand of smokeless cigarettes owned and manufactured by the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company that was launched in the United States in 1988.
It was intended as a less unhealthy replacement for conventional cigarettes, and whilst there were doubts both inside the company and outside as to whether the device functioned adequately as a nicotine delivery device, anti-drug campaigners also derided the product for its potential for use in the delivery of class A drugs such as crack cocaine.
The product never ultimately achieved the popularity that its manufacturers had sought as smokers complained about its unpleasant aftertaste, and even though it resembled a conventional cigarette, special instructions were still required so that smokers knew how to light it.
RJR worked to the theory that smokers would become hooked on the taste of Premier after purchasing two or three packets, but the reality was that large numbers of smokers only smoked a single cigarette and then shared the rest of the pack with others.
Premier was finally withdrawn from sale in 1989, less than a year after its introduction and despite costing over $300million to develop, its total costs are estimated to be in the region of $800million to $1billion.
According to RJ Reynolds’ CEO at the time, “It tastes like shit and smells like a fart” whilst also adding that, “We spent 350 million dollars and we ended up with a turd with a tip”.
How did the product work?
The product worked by heating and aerosolising tobacco rather than burning it.
The Premier cigarette was therefore a “stationary furnace” device that operated by separating the combustible material from the aerosol-generating material so that the inhaled by-product comprised glycerol and water rather than the combustion products which were nicotine and smoke constituents.
The flavouring was derived from tobacco, nicotine, the paper roll and a sprayed-on dried extract. Additional flavours that consisted primarily of raspberry ketone and chocolate were also added to enhance the tobacco taste to give rise to a “pleasing aroma” in the smoke.
This added flavour was the major reason that Premier failed in the market as the taste was very different from conventional cigarettes.
How did US health organisations respond when the product was launched?
Consider the following extract statement that was jointly issued by various US health organisations when the Premier smokeless cigarette was first launched:
“The American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and American Lung Association have filed a petition with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), asking that Premier be regulated as a drug. In filing this petition, we are not calling for an outright ban on Premier. We want simply for it to be properly tested before people use it.
We are especially concerned that Premier’s intriguing high-tech design will lure children and teenagers into the web of nicotine addiction.
RJR’s marketing emphasis on ‘clean enjoyment’ also may lull people who already smoke into a deceptive sense of safety when they really ought to give up the habit altogether.
According to the FDA, any product marketed that claims that it is healthier or safer, must be regulated by the FDA. Conventional cigarettes escape FDA scrutiny because they are promoted for the sheer pleasure of smoking and because the FDA does not consider them to be drugs or food. In introducing Premier, RJR is stepping beyond that loophole. The RJR claim that Premier is ‘cleaner’ is a poorly disguised way to imply ‘safer’ to thousands of people concerned about the health risks of smoking.
RJR knows that if their ads said ‘safer’ in place of ‘cleaner’ the FDA would step in.
In the meantime, RJR promises that Premier is an improvement over conventional cigarettes that burn with foul-smelling smoke. But, we are sceptical. How can we trust the same industry that still refuses to admit that cigarette smoking is harmful?”
Was the product’s taste and controversy the only reason why it failed?
In a word – no. The real problem was that smokers didn’t enjoy using the Premier smoke-free cigarette and there was also no reason for non-smokers to. RJ Reynolds had therefore launched a product for which there was no real market. After four months of very slow sales, the company eventually cut its losses and the Premier smokeless cigarette was withdrawn from sale.
It wasn’t however to be the company’s final foray into the marketplace. By the mid-1990s, widespread concern about passive smoking convinced the company that there was still a market for smokeless cigarettes. In 1996 it proceeded to spend a further $125 million on updating its efforts and this time around created a product called Eclipse.
A company spokesman described the company’s strategic reasoning when the product was first launched: “I think we can all agree that for many non-smokers and for many smokers, second-hand smoke is an annoyance, and to be able to reduce and almost eliminate that annoyance is a very positive step in the right direction,” he said.
An independent study found that when compared to ultra-low tar cigarettes, the Eclipse smokeless cigarette contained much higher levels of toxic substances.
This information was damaging to the Eclipse brand because the product had been pitched to the marketplace on account of its health credentials with its original advertising campaign even stating that, ‘The best choice for smokers who worry about their health is to quit. But Eclipse is the next best choice for those who have decided to continue smoking.’
The marketing message drew vehement opposition from many leading US health organisations and the American Lung Association issued a statement that said, ‘we fear that RJR’s health claims that this device is “safe” or “safer than cigarettes” may discourage smokers from quitting.’
Despite the huge public outcry from health authorities including the US Surgeon General, it transpired that the real reason Eclipse had failed to catch fire was because consumers still felt absolutely no desire for a smokeless cigarette.
Conclusion
Seeking to play up the health benefits of cigarettes is by its very nature a contradiction in terms. Whilst RJ Reynolds spent a huge amount of money on health research for its smokeless cigarette products, ultimately the company was trying to peddle the flawed idea that being slightly less deadly than a conventional cigarette constitutes a health benefit. The resultant opposition from health authorities merely bolstered the idea that the company was being less-than-above board about its true intentions.
The very idea of a smokeless cigarette suggests it should be targeted at people who don’t particularly enjoy smoking. There was therefore an obvious flaw in the thinking at RJ Reynolds because they quickly found themselves desperately trying to create a winning product that was intended to be successful with people who would never want it. People who don’t like the smell of smoke are probably not the ideal audience for a tobacco product because they already vote with their feet by not smoking at all!
As a final point, if you realise that there is no market for your product, it’s probably advisable not to launch an updated version of it in the hope of there now being a market that you already know doesn’t exist!
